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Privacy-Preserving Medical Credentials for Access Authorization 
ABSTRACT 
To combat the present Covid-19 pandemic, vaccination campaigns are being rolled out 
globally. Vaccine records can potentially be demanded for relatively casual use cases, e.g., 
access to gyms, bars, events, etc., heightening the risk of leaking PII (personally identifiable 
information) or medical information at inappropriate granularity. This disclosure describes 
possible techniques for privacy-preserving verification of medical credentials that are simple, 
flexible, tamper-evident, resistant to fraud, and interoperable with a wide variety of health 
standards and vaccine providers. Per the techniques, the holder of a vaccine card presents the 
card to a trusted witness, which coarsens vaccine information and strips the card of PII and 
trackable data to generate a vaccine summary. A verifier, e.g., one who grants the holder access 
to an event or a venue, is provided with just enough information to make an accept/reject 
decision. 
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BACKGROUND 
To combat the Covid-19 pandemic, vaccination campaigns are being rolled out globally, 
albeit unevenly. Various entities such as airlines, travel hubs, etc. expect to use vaccination 
records to enable user access to resources. However, vaccine records can potentially also be 
demanded for relatively casual use cases, e.g., access to gyms, bars, events, etc., increasing the 
risk of leaking PII (personally identifiable information) or medical information at inappropriate 
granularity since a vaccine card can inadvertently reveal information that those checking 
credentials do not need to know.  
Fig. 1: A typical model for access authorization based on medical credentials
Fig. 1 illustrates a typical workflow that enables user access to resources, e.g., the W3C 
verifiable credentials specification [1]. An issuer of medical credentials, e.g., a vaccine provider, 
lab, pharmacy, healthcare provider, public-health department, immunization information system, 
etc., generates verifiable credentials, e.g., a vaccine card. The holder, e.g., the person who 
received the vaccine, acquires, stores, and, upon demand, presents the medical credentials. A 
verifier, e.g., an airline, an usher at an event, requests the holder for credentials and verifies that 
they are properly signed. 
Vaccine cards typically include the full record about a vaccination event, including 
information about the patient, the vaccine provider, and vaccination doses. Vaccine cards are 
primarily intended as containers for private medical records, and, as such, can include personal 
or trackable information that is inappropriate to be shared with a verifier. 
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Existing techniques that share medical information with the verifier can thus also share 
PII. Moreover, privacy-preserving techniques, e.g., W3C verified credentials, preserve privacy to 
the extent enabled by the issuing medical authority, with limited or no user control. Many 
existing solutions (BBS+, ISO 18013, etc.) require substantial changes to issuer workflow to 
support privacy-preserving vaccine cards. Such changes depart from major standards. 
Vaccine passes, which typically include a single status to indicate whether the holder 
satisfies all vaccination requirements to access a place/event, are an attempt to address privacy 
concerns by stripping all PII and tracking information to enable an accept/reject decision by the 
verifier. However, vaccine passes tend to be specific to single use-cases; it is difficult for users to 
obtain and manage all the passes they may need.  
DESCRIPTION OF A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
Fig. 2: Privacy-preserving medical credentials for access authorization
Fig. 2 illustrates tamper-proof, privacy-preserving medical credentials for access 
authorization, per the proposed techniques of this disclosure. An issuer of medical credentials 
generates (1) verifiable credentials, e.g., a vaccine card. The holder receives the vaccine card, 
stores it on their device, and presents (2) it to a trusted witness, an independent third party such 
as a mobile wallet provider, a health organization, etc. The holder can then request the trusted 
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witness to generate a vaccine summary (3), which is a type of vaccine pass that can be stored on 
a mobile device.  
The trusted witness verifies the validity of the presented vaccine card and generates (3) a 
vaccine summary and associated proofs by removing PII and trackable information from the 
card. To reduce the risk of discovery of the holder’s identity based on medical information, the 
trusted witness changes the granularity of the medical information on the card as necessary. For 
example, if the vaccine card issued by the issuer indicates a date, a time (at the granularity of a 
minute or second), and a place of vaccination, the trusted witness can modify such information to 
indicate only the month of vaccination. A verifier who requests the holder for credentials 
receives (4) only the coarsened, PII-stripped vaccine summary, e.g., using a quick response (QR) 
code or other mechanism. 
Security and privacy measures 
To improve privacy and security, wallet providers can implement one or more of the 
following measures: 
● Non-machine-readable PII display: To support PII-required use cases such as identity 
verification, wallet providers can provide a way to view the user’s full name and date of 
birth associated with a vaccine summary, while making it difficult for the verifier to 
automatically record this information. A way to achieve this is to adopt the front-of-
card/back-of-card approach, e.g., where the user first presents the front of a card that 
includes PII for manual verification by the verifier, and then swipes the screen to reveal a 
QR code that includes the vaccine summary but no PII.  
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○ The front-of-card screen displays the pass overview, including the user’s PII. 
Verifiers can manually check that the user information matches their government 
ID. 
○ The back-of-card screen displays the QR code, which has no embedded PII, 
rendering it infeasible for a scanner to record PII. 
● Rotating QR code: The vaccine summary is displayed as a rotating QR code that is 
updated periodically which makes it impractical to be shared using a screenshot or photo. 
The rotating QR code can include the following parts: 
○ an assertion that includes a single-use device key and vaccination fields; 
○ a trusted witness proof for tamper-protection; 
○ a device proof that includes the device signature and signing timestamp (used for 
QR code rotation); etc. 
For improved security, the wallet provider can 
○ ensure the QR code is generated with an accurate time even if the device’s clock 
is set incorrectly;  
○ update the QR code periodically in a way that the device signature time is never 
older than a threshold, e.g., 30 seconds; and 
○ ensure that the device/app is trusted before signing the single-use device keys. 
● Preventing vaccine-summary fingerprinting: Even though user PII is not included in the 
vaccine summary, care is taken to avoid providing information that may be specific 
enough to track users across presentations. For example, if the date, time, and place of 
vaccination is presented to high accuracy, the user’s past location, or at least the location 
6
: Privacy-Preserving Medical Credentials for Access Authorization
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021
of vaccination, can be determined. Such vaccine-summary fingerprinting is prevented by 
designing fields to avoid the likelihood of low bucket-size. For example, 
○ the date of vaccination is coarsened to include year and month but not day or 
time; 
○ rather than the actual dates of vaccination, only the number of days between doses 
is included; 
○ the issuance date is periodically reset by the trusted witness and is rounded down 
to the start of a day; etc. 
● Signature unlinkability: To prevent verifiers from tracking users across presentations 
based on the credential signature, the trusted witness service generates multiple single-
use signatures and enables the device of the user to replenish the signatures once they 
have been used. 
● Blinded signatures: To prevent verifiers from colluding with the trusted witness to access 
the user’s PII or track them across presentations, the device key is blinded by the device 
before being sent to the trusted witness to be signed (blinded signatures). The blinded key 
is signed using a key derived from the trusted witness key based on the content of the 
vaccine summary. The presentation can then be signed with the unblinded device key. 
This mechanism provides a binding between the device key and vaccine summary 
without disclosing the device key to the trusted witness. 
● Device pinning: Although rotating QR codes and ID-proofing can largely prevent 
unauthorized sharing of vaccine passes, these can fail if verifiers opt not to do ID-
proofing. To prevent casual fraud, e.g., where users log onto their health portal on 
someone else’s device to provision it with their own vaccine pass, wallet providers can 
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enforce device pinning, e.g., a given vaccine summary is saved only on one device at a 
time. 
Presentation format 
The vaccine summary can be modeled as a verifiable credential that includes the 
vaccination assertion signed by both the trusted witness and the mobile device. As explained 
before, the verifiable credential can be encoded using a QR code and displayed on the device.  
The vaccine summary assertion can be represented as a JSON (JavaScript Object 
Notation) object including fields such as the single-use key of the device; the vaccine code (e.g., 
as defined by Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources standard); the country of vaccination; 
the days between doses; the date of vaccination (in YYYY-MM format); etc. The verifiable 
credential can include fields such as an identifier - a link such as a Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) - that uniquely identifies the presentation; a type (e.g., verifiable credential or vaccination 
certificate); the ID of the trusted witness, e.g., its URL; the ID or URL of the issuer; the 
coarsened date and time when the credential became valid; the trusted witness signature; the 
device signature; etc. The QR code that encodes the verifiable credential can be designed to 
enable efficient storage without relying on special characters that can potentially cause scanning 
errors. 
Issuance of a vaccine summary 
When a trusted witness issues a vaccine summary, it can: 
● verify the vaccine card signature (possibly leaving it to the verifier to decide to trust the 
issuer);  
● identify doses that shouldn’t be considered, e.g., because they are marked incomplete or 
refer to a recalled lot number; 
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● generate the verifiable credential; 
● generate or obtain single-use public device keys (generated either by the trusted witness 
or by the device); and  
● generate single-use proofs. 
As mentioned before, blinded signatures can be used to keep the device keys from being 
accessed by the trusted service.  
Verification procedure 
To verify the vaccine summary of a holder, the verifier can check the validity and 
trustworthiness of the verifiable credential (encoded as a QR code) and make an accept/reject 
decision. To do so, the verifier could 
● check that the issuer is trusted; 
● check the trusted witness is trusted; 
● check the issuer signature; 
● check the device signature; 
● check that the device proof timestamp is sufficiently recent, e.g., under two minutes of 
age; 
● check for the allowable vaccine code; 
● optionally check for the allowable country of vaccination; 
● optionally check the dose count, e.g., days between doses; 
● optionally check the dose interval; and 
● optionally check the administration recency, e.g., no more than a year ago. 
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As mentioned earlier, the verifier also could (manually) check the holder’s identity, e.g., by 
checking that the name and date of birth (DOB) match the holder’s government ID and by 
checking that the government ID portrait matches the holder. 
The vaccine-summary techniques proposed herein are flexible, compatible with different 
formats of issuer data, and convert such data into a privacy-preserving output format that can be 
shown to verifiers. To implement vaccine summary verification as proposed herein, vaccine 
providers would not need to change the way they issue health cards, and health-interoperability 
standards would not need to be updated. For example, the trusted witness can issue a BBS+ 
signed credential. One-time use keys prevent tracking across presentations. Vaccine information 
is coarsened such that the verifier gets no more information than needed to make an accept/reject 
decision. The disclosed vaccine summary is tamper-evident, difficult to share, and resistant to 
fraud. The techniques apply to vaccine (or other medical credential) verification, medical testing, 
vaccine exemption, etc., and are amenable to simple design and speedy implementation. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure proposes possible techniques for privacy-preserving verification of 
medical credentials that are simple, flexible, tamper-evident, resistant to fraud, and interoperable 
with a wide variety of health standards and vaccine providers. Per the techniques, the holder of a 
vaccine card presents the card to a trusted witness, which coarsens vaccine information and strips 
the card of PII and trackable data to generate a vaccine summary. A verifier, e.g., one who grants 
the holder access to an event or a venue, is provided with just enough information to make an 
accept/reject decision. 
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